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Abstract: New Zealand marine fishing activities create many types of environmental externalities. Legislation requires 
that the externalities be internalised and fisheries management agencies must choose from a wide range of instruments 
which are best suited to the task. Selection of best instruments can be aided by following a hierarchical decision process, 
which first screens the universe of instruments to produce a likely set, then tests that list against implementation criteria to 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
New Zealand has the fourth largest Exclusive Economic 
Zone in the world.  In 1986, New Zealand introduced the 
quota management system as a tool to promote sustainable 
management of its fishery resources.  New Zealand was 
amongst the first countries to do this on a universal basis. 
Even though the ITQ system has been successful in a 
number of respects, one of the major concerns that has 
become increasingly manifest during the last decade is 
environmental externalities associated with the activities 
of commercial fishers.  Such concerns have led to a wider 
focus on the need for sustainable management of the 
marine environment within the EEZ.  This is reflected in 
the purpose and principles of the recently reviewed 
Fisheries Act 1996 (Fig. 1).  
 
The objective of our research project, commissioned by the 
Ministry of Fisheries, is to develop a Decision Support 
System (DSS) to assist the Ministry to select the best 
combination of ‘instruments’ for internalising the 
environmental externalities of commercial fishing.   This 
paper provides an outline of the framework and process 
that has been followed to develop this system. 
2. THE DECISION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK 
 
Decision makers in fisheries management, when faced 
with environmental problems, have a logical sequence of 
decisions which they must work through before deciding 
on the policy instruments which are most likely to resolve 
the environmental problems.  This sequence is as follows: 
x Environmental impacts/externalities must be defined. 
x Type of fishery within which the impact/externality 
occurs must be defined. 
x Significance of the environmental 
impacts/externalities must be evaluated. 
x Range of policy instrument(s) that will internalise the 
externality must be determined. 
x Effectiveness of these instruments, in meeting the 
environmental aims of fisheries and other related 
legislation, needs determining. 
x Instruments are selected that best meet a range of 
evaluation criteria. 
This process is portrayed schematically in Figure 2. 
 
 
3. BIOPHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES IN NEW ZEALAND FISHERIES 
 
One of the problems we faced in reviewing the literature 
on environmental externalities was how to determine the 
relative significance of externalities, i.e., how to express 
the extent of the externality problem in terms of indices 
such as species survival, sustainability, etc.  While many 
authors have identified the types of externalities associated 
with particular fisheries, few have been able to report on 
their significance.  Significance is important for several 
reasons: 
x To meet the requirements of sections 8 
(Sustainability) and 9 (Environmental principles) of the 
Fisheries Act 1996 (see Figure 1); 
x To determine the relative ecological impacts of the 
different externalities so that priorities for remedial 
action can be determined. 
 
Hughey et al (2000) identified the New Zealand fisheries 
in which ‘significant’ externalities occur as: 
x Any bottom dredging fishery on a non silt/sand 
substrate, e.g., oyster and scallop; 
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x Any bottom trawl fishery on a non silt/sand substrate, 
e.g., snapper and orange roughy; 
x Long line fisheries where there is the presence of non 
target fish species or seabirds in high numbers at the same 
fishing water level, e.g., tuna; 
x Mid water trawl fisheries where marine mammals 
occur in ‘significant’ numbers, e.g., southern squid; and 
x Gillnet fisheries where dolphins are present, e.g., rig 
and other small sharks and kahawai. 
 
 
4. INSTRUMENTS FOR  INTERNALISING 
FISHERIES EXTERNALITIES  
 
4.1. Underlying rationale for internalising externalities 
 
Negative externalities are costs imposed upon another 
person or firm where there is no contractual relationship 
between the two parties.  The term externality is also 
widely used to describe situations where there is damage 
caused to part of the natural environment as a 
consequence of economic activities, including in some 
instances by fishing.  In those cases costs are recognised 
by individuals who are concerned about the natural 
environment. Because of the absence of a contractual 
relationship between two parties, external costs can be 
ignored by the person or firm who creates them. The 
outcome is that inefficient levels of production or 
consumption occur.  
 
If fishing effort is identified as being at an inefficient 
level, actions can be proposed to internalise costs and 
reduce the externalities. Generally, externalities can only 
be reduced at some cost and there is an economically 
optimal level of externality reduction. The optimal level 
occurs where the marginal cost of externality reduction 
equals the marginal benefit from externality reduction 
(Pearce and Turner 1990). 
 
Internalisation occurs when the external costs associated 
with fishing are ‘recognised’ by the firm creating the 
externality. A key point is the need to change fishing 
companies’ behaviour or their fishing-related activities, to 
avoid, remedy, or mitigate externalities. This can occur if 
the firms creating the external costs take any of the actions 
listed below, resulting in reduced incidence of the 
externality creating behaviour: 
x Reduce or stop or change the pattern or timetabling of 
fishing in an area, or during certain times. 
x Apply more caution during fishing to reduce risk of 
polluting, or causing damage by fishing in multi species 
areas, or trawling the sea floor. 
  
Figure 1. Purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
PART II: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
8. Purpose – (1) the purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. 
 (2) In this Act- 
      “Ensuring sustainability” means- 
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonable foreseeable needs of 
future generations; and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic 
environment: 
“Utilisation” means conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources to enable people to 
provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being. 
9. Environmental principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this Act, in 
relation to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into account the following 
environmental principles: 
(a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their long-term 
viability. 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained. 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected. 
10. Information principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under this Act, in relation 
to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into account the following information 
principles: 
(a) Decisions should be based on the best available information: 
(b) Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available in any case: 
(c) Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate: 
The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take any 
measure to achieve the purpose of this Act. 
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x Change behaviour once fish have been caught and 
deal with non-target fish species, to reduce bycatch, and 
potential discards.  
x Change behaviour once non-target species have been 
caught and deal with them as effectively as possible to 
minimise the externality. 
x Invest in activities such as stock enhancement or 
habitat creation to offset the environmental effect. 
 
To address the above we have surveyed a wide range of 
international literature covering a broad spectrum of 
environmental management issues. 
 
4.2. Instruments for internalising environmental 
externalities in fishing 
 
Environmental externalities are associated with many 
economic activities and there is an extensive literature 
analysing types of externality, instruments for correcting 
externalities, and criteria for evaluating those instruments 
(Verhoef 1999).  
 
Fishing environmental externalities comprise a range of 
diverse events: marine pollution from ship’s discharges; 
bycatch of non-target fish species; damage and mortality 
to non-fish species; and destruction of fish habitat. While 
all of these externalities are undesirable, in few instances 
will they cause disastrous outcomes. If that is the case then 
society will typically tolerate some amount of the 
externalities. Only in some instances will society judge 
that fisheries externalities are unacceptable and strive to 
avoid them completely. The result is that in many cases 
society will find acceptable, instruments which reduce the 
level of externalities so long as the level achieved meets 
some minimum standards. In cases where any damage is 
unacceptable society will resort to instruments that target 
zero level of fisheries externality.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Preliminary framework for the Decision Support System.
 
 
Perceived environmental problem with fishery 
Define type of fishery by fish stock(s) and catch method(s) 
Carry out ‘EIA’ – identify types of biophysical 
environmental problems and evaluate significance 
Significant problem 
Not a significant 
problem 
Identify range of instruments potentially applicable 
to type(s) of problem(s) 
Assess likely instruments against 
range of evaluation criteria 
Select most likely 
instrument(s) 
Implement and monitor within an 
adaptive management framework 
Environmental problems being 
avoided, remedied or mitigated 
Environmental problems 
not being adequately 
addressed 
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Many instruments have been invoked and used in many 
countries, often in an attempt to reduce or prevent 
excessive harvesting of fish species. Some are used 
specifically to tackle fishing environmental externalities; 
others appear to have potential for use with internalising 
fisheries externalities. A large amount of literature exists 
exploring the effectiveness of various fisheries 
management policy tools and the requirements for their 
success (e.g., Hanna 1997, OECD 1997).  Table 1 
describes the attributes of the different policy instruments 
for internalising environmental externalities and their 
potential application to fisheries management. 
5. EVALUATION CRITERIA 
 
Determining which instruments are ‘best’ requires criteria 
to judge performance and data to evaluate performance of 
the instruments. However, and as noted by (Slooten and 
Dawson 1995), most evaluation studies of the performance 
of some of these instruments are at best limited.  
Consequently, clear and robust criteria are necessary to 
evaluate their performance as a basis for selecting 
appropriate management tools. 
 
Table 1.  A summary of the Instruments. 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to  fishing 
Regulatory 
No take zones 
 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
Hoki spawning areas No fishing in specified zones means 
externalities not created 
Marine Reserves Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
protect habitat 
Banks Peninsula, Long 
Bay etc 
Area set aside for preservation of marine 
species 
Closed seasons, 
areas 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
Near sub Antarctic 
islands. 
No fishing during designated times and 
/or in prescribed areas. 
Size or sex 
selectivity 
Direct effort away from 
specified ages, sex 
individuals 
Rock lobster, size 
requirement 
Requirement for fishers to return to sea 
all prohibited catch 
Bycatch Reduction 
Devices (BRD) 
Reduce rate of  bycatch of 
fish and other species 
Pingers for Hectors 
Dolphin 
Vary technology used while fishing to 
reduce bycatch of fish or other species 
Technology ban Prevent externalities 
associated with specific 
harvesting technologies  
Drift netting ban Reduce bycatch by only allowing 
techniques which cause few externalities 
Input limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with number 
of potlifts, boat days etc 
Foveaux Strait oyster 
fishery 
Reduce volume of fishing activity and 
associated externalities 
Catch limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with effort 
Foveaux Strait oysters Limit total harvesting and associated 
externalities 
Retention and 
utilisation 
requirements 
Reduce dumping of target 
and non -target species 
CAAQ, FA AQ Allow non target catch to be landed, not 
dumped 
Financial systems 
Taxes Provide incentive to 
reduce, eg, pollution 
Conservation Services 
Levy, applied to some 
non-fish bycatch 
Apply tax to variable inputs, boats, 
outputs, to reduce profits and 
externalities 
Subsidies Reduce costs of inputs R&D assistance Reduce costs of developing BRD 
Environmental 
performance 
bonds 
Provide financial 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities  
Mining, biodiversity 
protection 
Provide incentive to not damage habitat 
or marine ecosystem 
Financial 
inducements 
Bribe to behave in 
desired way 
 Financial reward if do not create 
environmental externalities 
Rights based    
IQ, ITQ, IVQ 
CDQ, Share 
fisheries 
Reduce race to fish NZ QMS Creation of rights reduces need to race, 
provides incentive to maintain asset, so 
less externalities created 
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Voluntary approaches 
Co management Right holders draw up 
operating systems 
Challenger Scallop Peer agreements reduce externalities 
Codes of practice Agreed behaviour which 
limits externalities  
HSNO, Agchem Industry develop, adopt, codes which 
limit or preclude externalities 
Accredited 
environmental 
management 
systems 
Industry develops 
systems - externally 
audited prior to 
accreditation 
Marine Stewardship 
Council, ISO 14001 
Industry develop, adopt, systems with 
environmental policy which aims to limit 
or preclude externalities 
Conservation 
easements 
Negotiated agreements 
restricting a parties 
behaviour 
QEII Trust, Ducks 
Unlimited 
Negotiated agreement to not take certain 
actions eg create externalities 
Legal Remedies 
Tort law Liability for pollution 
damages 
RMA is a 'strict 
liability' law 
Potential damages claims provide 
incentive to avoid creating externalities 
Education Information supply 
Publications, 
guides, kits, etc 
numerous Numerous, e.g., 
biodiversity protection 
Informed people change behaviour, not 
create externalities 
Informal 
regulation e.g., 
environmental 
reporting 
Toxics Release Inventory 
and corporate 
environmental reporting 
 Information release plus community 
pressure, modifies firm behaviour 
 
The criteria presented below are in five sections.  Criteria 
within each of the sections vary in terms of the strength of 
direction they give, i.e., the environmental and Treaty of 
Waitangi criteria are prescriptive because they are 
mandatory under existing legislation. Economic and social 
criteria are less prescriptive because policy advisors and 
decision-makers have greater latitude to consider these.  
Management criteria fall in between.  In the main, they 
reflect attributes of good policy analysis. 
 
5.1. Environmental criteria 
 
The development of environmental criteria requires 
consideration of: 
x Fisheries Act (1996) requirements 
x Other relevant NZ legislative requirements 
x NZ’s international treaty obligations 
x Government ‘resource management/environmental’ 
policy 
x Industry self-management environmental principles. 
Fortunately, following its recent review, the Fisheries Act 
has been developed in an integrated way.  It draws on 
international conventions (e.g., UNCLOS Convention) 
and is complementary to related legislation (i.e., the RMA 
1991) and policy (e.g., the Environment 2010 Strategy 
(MfE 1995)).  Because of this approach to development of 
the legislation, it has been possible to integrate more 
recent environmental management considerations into 
development of fisheries policy and its implementation.  
Specifically, development of the Proposed Environmental 
Performance Indicators of the Marine Environment (MfE 
1998) builds on key Fisheries Act requirements. 
 
The following criteria, which more than meet the 
requirements of the Fisheries Act (1996), apply to the 
selection of policy instruments. 
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OVERALL ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERION:  
x The Policy Instrument(s) safeguards the life supporting capacity of the marine environment in a healthy functioning 
state. 
SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA require that the policy instrument:  
x contributes to maintaining ‘utilised’ fish stocks above a level that ensures their long-term viability 
x assists with avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment 
x ensures fishing related mortality of marine mammals or other wildlife is below a maximum allowable fishing-related 
mortality level 
x will seek to support aims of the NZ Biodiversity strategy which are relevant to implementing the Environmental 
Principles of the Fisheries Act, specifically: 
- it will help ensure natural marine habitats and ecosystems maintained (including associated 
or dependent species) are in a healthy functioning state; and 
- it contributes to ensuring there are no human induced extinctions of marine species; 
- protects habitat of particular significance for fish. 
 
5.2. Rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi: 
Treaty rights criteria 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 is the founding document 
of New Zealand as a nation. It is part of the law of New 
Zealand to the extent that it is incorporated into statute. 
A number of statutes relating to the marine environment 
incorporate reference to the principles of the Treaty and 
to the values and traditional relations of Mäori with 
natural places and resources.  
 
By the Treaty, the Crown confirmed and guaranteed the 
existing rights of tangata whenua to land and resources, 
including rights in respect of intangible taonga.  For this 
reason, it is imperative that the choice of policy 
instruments to avoid, remedy or mitigate environmental 
externalities associated with commercial fisheries is 
assessed in terms of their implications for Mäori tribes, 
which have guaranteed to them under Article II the right 
to retain (and have restored to them if taken without 
consent) tribal resources and taonga, and the right to 
manage them according to their cultural preferences. 
 
TREATY OF WAITANGI CRITERION:  
x The policy instrument(s) chosen will protect Mäori customary fishery rights and practices.  
 
5.3. Economic criteria  
 
There are five broad economic requirements for 
assessment of the performance of policy instruments to 
address environmental externalities: 
1. Efficiency (including transaction costs) 
2. Encouragement of innovation (dynamic efficiency) 
3. Profitability/International competitiveness 
4. Cost-effectiveness/Least cost policy 
5. Internalisation (full cost principle). 
 
The following ‘overall’ and ‘specific’ criteria are 
designed to reflect these requirements: 
 
OVERALL ECONOMIC CRITERION:  
x The Policy Instrument(s) maintains the economic viability of the fishery and downstream economic activities. 
SPECIFIC ECONOMIC CRITERIA: 
x The policy instrument is the least cost way to achieve the desired environmental objective 
x The policy instrument forces the person causing the environmental externality to face all (or more) of the costs that 
they impose on the environment or on others 
x Windfalls and wipeouts will be avoided as far as practicable 
x The policy instrument minimises transaction costs 
x The policy instrument does not result in undesirable changes in market power, either for buyers or seller. 
 
Cullen et al (2000) identify what is meant by each of 
these criteria, and how they may be assessed in practice. 
The key requirement is to find the least economic cost 
way to achieve internalisation of the externalities, when 
imposing the polluter pays principle. Impacts of each 
policy on transaction costs, market power and 
windfalls/wipeouts should also be considered. 
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5.4. Socio-cultural criteria  
 
There are three major areas for criteria development 
here: 
a. Community 
b. Protection of access to other users 
c. Equity 
The suggested criteria are: 
OVERALL SOCIO-CULTURAL CRITERION:  
x The Policy Instrument(s) will not have undesirable social/cultural impacts on fisheries dependent communities. 
SPECIFIC SOCIO-CULTURAL CRITERIA: 
x The policy instrument(s) will not have adverse social impacts on fisheries dependent communities. 
x The policy instrument will protect access by recreational fishers to adequate fish stocks to satisfy their needs 
x The policy instrument(s) will safeguard the needs of future generations. 
 
Community 
Introduction of fisheries management policies can have 
significant effects on some communities which are 
heavily dependent on fishing for employment and 
income. The New Zealand Government acted 
precipitously in 1983 to remove part time fishers from 
the industry by declaring all fishers who received less 
than 80 percent of their income from fishing, to no 
longer be eligible to fish commercially. Selection of 
fisheries management policies in some instances must 
consider the impact on communities. 
Recreational fishing 
The rights of recreational fishers are different from those 
of commercial quota holders, and have not as yet been 
well defined. Compared to the QMS and the ITQ, and 
the recently established regulations for Mäori customary 
fishing, the recreational sector has no equivalent 
framework for precisely determining rights in the 
marine resource. For many New Zealanders, however, 
the freedom to go fishing is considered a birthright. It is 
imperative that tools to manage environmental 
externalities associated with commercial fisheries are 
evaluated in terms of how they may impact on access by 
recreational fishers to fishery resources. 
 
Equity 
The concept of equity underpins the principle of 
sustainable management. Equity can be defined as 
intragenerational equity and intergenerational equity.  
The recent environmental statutes in New Zealand, 
including the current fisheries legislation, have 
embraced the sustainability principle. This is a 
requirement to our generations to manage the resource 
base such that the average quality of life we ensure 
ourselves can potentially be shared by all future 
generations.  
 
Equity questions arise not only on the consumption side 
of public policy (“Who benefits?”), but also on the 
production side (“Who pays?”). There is no clear right 
answer to what an appropriate distribution of such 
benefits and costs to society’s members should be. 
Unlike efficiency questions, which, despite a host of 
conceptual problems, often do have right answers, e.g., 
“This instrument to manage environmental externalities 
is the cheapest”- equity questions do not. There are, 
however, several principles that can guide consideration 
of equity issues in the decision making process. 
 
5.5. Management criteria  
 
Fisheries managers have limited resources available to 
achieve management’s objectives. They can be expected 
to search for internalisation mechanisms which can be 
implemented at moderate cost, are effective in achieving 
externality internalisation, including in less than optimal 
circumstances.  Fisheries managers need to consider the 
following ‘managerial’ criteria when evaluating 
internalisation mechanisms. 
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OVERALL MANAGEMENT CRITERION:  
x The Policy Instrument(s) is capable of being implemented within existing management constraints. 
 
SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT CRITERIA: 
x The policy instrument(s) is/are easy to introduce and readily modified 
x The policy instrument(s) is/are low cost to administer 
x The policy instrument(s) does not require specific infrastructure that is not available at an acceptable price or in 
reasonable time 
x Application of the policy instrument(s) requires low levels of information about the state of the fishery, the activities of 
the fishing companies and the effectiveness of the internalisation mechanism 
x The policy instrument’s performance falls within optimal operating conditions 
x The policy instrument(s) do not make unacceptable demands upon the skill, capability, safety, and health of fisheries 
management staff. 
 
Introduction and modification 
Some fisheries policies require new legislation to 
introduce. Others can be introduced and varied by a 
change of regulations – a much simpler process. 
Managers who want to achieve speedy improvement in 
situations where externalities are present will favour 
instruments that can be readily introduced and varied. 
 
Administration costs 
Answers to that question will be determined by the 
location of the fishery – inshore/mid water/deepwater; by 
the ease or difficulty in achieving compliance with the 
system; by the costs of monitoring fishing activities. 
Budgetary pressures will force fisheries managers to 
prefer low administration cost mechanisms. 
 
Specific fisheries management infrastructure 
requirements 
Some internalisation instruments may require that 
fisheries managers have specific items of equipment, 
e.g., for monitoring, or enforcement such as deepwater 
capability ships. Where these are not available to 
fisheries managers, alternative mechanisms must be 
selected to avoid the infrastructure requirement. A 
widely used alternative is to negotiate or require that 
fishing companies carry observers on board ships, or self 
report, to obviate the need for fisheries management 
vessels. 
 
Information requirements 
Regulatory authorities often have poor information 
supply about those items and this can restrict their 
ability to successfully apply internalisation instruments. 
Where information availability is weak, fisheries 
managers will select internalisation instruments that 
make least information demands.  Section 10 of the 
Fisheries Act deals with the Information Principles – 
good practice guidelines can be used here. 
 
How well do the internalisation mechanisms perform 
in sub-optimal conditions? 
A first best internalisation instrument in optimal 
conditions may perform poorly in sub optimal 
conditions. Fisheries managers often operate in second 
best worlds of limited resources, poor information 
availability, variable causes of externalities, etc. Their 
preference may be for versatile internalisation 
instruments which operate satisfactorily in many 
situations, rather than a mechanism which only 
performs well in ideal conditions. Is the internalisation 
instrument self funding? Some mechanisms have 
potential to be self-funding by requiring payment of fees 
by industry participants. This feature will increase their 
likelihood of acceptance by fisheries mangers. 
 
Pressure on fisheries management staff 
Some fisheries internalisation instruments require 
frontline staff to tackle risky tasks, or to deal with 
unpleasant situations. These pressures require specially 
trained fisheries management staff, payment of higher 
wage rates, and their overall effect is to increase costs of 
fisheries management. Internalisation instruments which 
do not lead to confrontation, do not require specially 
trained staff, or expose fisheries staff to risk, are likely to 
be more attractive to fisheries managers. 
6. JUDGING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
We have identified 7 types of fisheries: trawl netting, 
seining, set netting, dredging, line fishing, pot fishing 
and diving.  For each type of fishing there is a range of 
possible environmental impact classes: bottom/sea bed 
disturbance, non-fish bycatch, non-target fish bycatch 
and pollution. Combining these classifications provides 
the following matrix (Table 2).
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Table 2. Likely areas of concern for fisheries managers based on an analysis of combinations of fishing activity types and 
classification of impacts. 
Type of fishing 
activity 
Impact classification 
 Bottom/sea bed 
disturbance 
Non-fish bycatch Non-target fish 
bycatch 
Pollution 
x Trawl netting * * * * 
x Seining * * * * 
x Set netting - * * * 
x Dredging * - * * 
x Line fishing - - * * 
x Pot fishing - - * * 
x Diving - - - * 
TOTAL POSSIBLE 
IMPACTS 
3 4 6 7 
KEY: * Fishing activity can cause a significant environmental impact 
- Fishing activity unlikely to cause a significant environmental impact 
 
Analysis of the table indicates there is a total of 20 
fishing activity-impact combinations.  Each of these has 
a possible 21 internalisation instruments that can be 
applied to it.  Clearly, this can be viewed as an imposing 
exercise.  However, for most types of fishing activities it 
is unlikely there will be more than 2 potentially 
significant environmental impacts. Consequently, the 
array of instruments to choose from is much more 
manageable. 
 
The criteria identified above need to be prioritised/ 
weighted to reflect the project requirements and the aims 
of the Fisheries Act 1996.  In the field of Environmental 
Impact Assessment, criteria are often: 
x Differentially weighted; 
x Subject to matrix analysis; 
x Added, multiplied or subject to some other form of 
statistical treatment; 
x Used in checklist form. 
It is our view that a combination of approaches is 
necessary as shown in Figure 3, so that: 
(a) Having completed an EIA and clearly defined the 
‘type of fishery’ and its associated problem(s) then 
instruments can be chosen and subjected to evaluation 
under the Environmental Criteria that are accorded the 
top priority.  This is because the Fisheries Act concerns 
sustainable fisheries and sustainable fisheries are reliant 
upon successful achievement of section 9 of the Act.  
Environmental criteria are also context specific, i.e., not 
all criteria need be met in every circumstance. 
(b) Subject to environmental criteria being met then 
Treaty of Waitangi needs should be considered next. 
(c) Economic and socio-cultural criteria are next in 
importance – if the instrument is ‘uneconomic’ then it is 
pointless examining socio-cultural and management 
issues. 
(d) Management criteria should be dealt with separately. 
 
To improve manageability further we have gone the next 
step of determining, in a preliminary way, the potential 
effectiveness of each instrument within each of the 
combinations concerned (Table 3).  Summing the 
effectiveness over the likely range of applicable 
instruments provides us with a means of identifying 
those most likely to internalise and correct the 
externality. 
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Figure 3. Hierarchical framework for considering instruments employed to internalise environmental externalities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Evaluation of the likely effectiveness of a range of policy instruments in addressing a significant line fishing-non 
fish bycatch problem. 
 
Impact 
class 
Instrument 
Environmenta
l criteria 
Treaty of 
Waitangi 
criteria 
Economic 
criteria 
Socio- 
cultural 
criteria 
Management 
criteria 
Overall 
effective-
ness rating 
Non-fish 
bycatch 
 
No Take 
Zones 
100% in No 
Take area. 
Displaced 
fishing to 
other regions  
may result in 
bycatch 
Could 
negatively 
impact on 
tangata 
whenua if 
they line fish 
species in 
the Zone 
If No Take 
zone can be 
substituted 
by another 
fishing area, 
economic 
cost may be 
slight, and 
vice versa.  
Likely 
high 
recreation 
costs in 
some areas 
Requires 
monitoring 
to see if zero 
take occurs. 
 
 BRD, e.g., 
change in 
hook size to 
avoid bycatch 
Could be 
100% 
effective if 
change avoids 
bycatch 
Nil Cost of BR 
device 
Nil Monitoring 
to gauge 
impact of 
BRD, and if 
being used. 
 
 Technology 
ban/ codes of 
practice, e.g., 
timing of line 
set 
Effectiveness 
will depend on 
uptake of 
change 
 
Nil Cost 
depends on 
amount it 
reduces 
profits 
Nil Monitoring  
 Taxes, on 
variable 
inputs, boats, 
output, catch – 
Conservation 
Services Levy 
Effectiveness 
will depend on 
fishers 
responsiveness 
to tax, and the 
tax level 
Some impact 
if tangata 
whenua line 
fish that 
species 
Cost 
depends on 
amount it 
reduces 
profits 
Nil Need to 
estimate tax 
driver, e.g., 
variable 
inputs, to 
levy tax 
 
 
7. DEVELOPING THE DECISION SUPPORT 
SYSTEM 
 
The final phase of our work, development of a Decision 
Support System and associated guidelines to make all of  
 
 
 
this information manageable from the perspective of a 
policy analyst, will establish how this process can be 
operationalised. 
Spectrum of ESD based outcomes 
Ecosystem sustainability criteria 
Treaty of Waitangi criteria Socio-Economic criteria 
Instruments employed to internalise environmental externalities 
Management criteria filter 
1st Order criteria 
2nd Order criteria 
3rd Order criteria 
11 
An electronic Decision Support System provides a 
means of doing this.  In developing this DSS there are 3 
major issues: 
x Gaining information about impacts of fishing at 
each site; 
x Lack of knowledge of the relative and absolute 
effectiveness of instruments; and 
x How to deal with multiple problems and synergy 
between instruments. 
These challenges require the system to operate as an 
adaptive learning approach, providing a tool to aid 
policy analysts to choose the most likely combination of 
instruments for any particular circumstance. 
 
For a specific fishery, and environmental externality, the 
DSS will lead the decision-maker through a multi-stage 
process, which will ultimately: 
x Reduce the range of solutions 
x Provide detailed application to a subset of solutions 
x Few criteria will be assessed at the first stage 
x Few solutions will be assessed at later stages 
x Weighted matrix approach to scoring instruments 
x Outputs are overall scores for each relevant 
instrument. 
x A qualitative summary can then be provided. 
 
The system makes substantial information requirements, 
but then this is consistent with Section 10 of the 
Fisheries Act.  These requirements lie in three main 
areas: 
1. Environmental Impacts of fishing 
x Information source, ‘science’ 
2. Relative importance of impacts 
x Information source,  managers and/or community 
3. Effectiveness of instruments 
x Information source, managers and /or community. 
In all cases it will be necessary to consider if combined 
use of instruments will produce a higher score than a 
single instrument. Researchers will provide indicative 
ratings, to generate scores for relevant instruments.  DSS 
users will adjust the ratings, to generate new scores 
based upon expert knowledge and adaptive learning. 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Potential mechanisms for internalising the externalities 
from commercial fishing have been identified. We have 
also identified and developed a wide range of criteria 
that can be used to determine which policy mechanisms 
are best suited to resolving the environmental 
externalities.  The principal decision criteria are those 
based around section 9 of the Fisheries Act, i.e., the 
Environmental Principles.  Assuming there are 
mechanisms that can achieve these criteria then further 
criteria representing Treaty of Waitangi, economic, 
socio-cultural and management issues need to be 
implemented.  A Decision Support System is being 
developed to help make all this information useful to 
decision-makers.  The challenge will be to keep the 
system adaptive to the information requirements being 
generated within sustainable fisheries management. 
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